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Abstract
This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes
(2007), in which suppliers oﬀer diﬀerentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether
to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some
technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and
an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper is about a buyer’s incentives to reveal the own preferences to the suppliers in a
procurement auction. We rely on a setting which is studied in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes
(2007) (GGD henceforth) and provide some technical remarks to their analysis, complements
and extensions which are described in the second half of this introduction.
GGD consider a setting in which a male buyer denoted with B needs to buy a certain object
(for instance, an industrial ﬁrm needs to procure an input) and faces n ≥ 2 female suppliers
which can provide the object. The products oﬀered by the suppliers are diﬀerentiated and
for each supplier i there is a parameter xi ∈ [0,1] which represents the degree of ﬁtness of i’s
product with B’s needs; precisely, if B buys that object and pays p then his payoﬀ is xi − p.
B is risk neutral and uses a ﬁrst score auction in which suppliers simultaneously submit bids
p1 ≥ 0,...,p n ≥ 0, and then B buys product i such that xi − pi >x j − pj for any j 6= i;t i e s
can be broken arbitrarily.1 Before running the auction, B observes the values x1,...,x n but
suppliers do not: each supplier views x1,...,x n as the realizations of n i.i.d. random variables,
each with the same absolutely continuous c.d.f. F and strictly positive density f = F0 on
(0,1).
Before observing x1,...,x n, B has the same beliefs as the suppliers about his values for the
objects, and GGD inquire whether at this stage B should commit to a policy of no information
revelation (concealment policy, henceforth denoted by C), or instead to a policy in which he
will reveal to each supplier i the value of xi (private revelation policy, henceforth denoted by
PR).2 Clearly, under PR supplier i may charge a premium price trying to extract B’s surplus,
especially if xi is large, but PR also intensiﬁes price competition since a low ﬁtness supplier
needs to reduce her bid to be competitive, and this may force also high ﬁtness suppliers to
compete aggressively. Hence, whether B prefers PR or C is not obvious; we use ∼ and Â to
represent B’s preferences between C and PR.
A major claim in GGD is that if the density f is (weakly) increasing, then PRÂC. However,
in Section 2 we give an example in which f is increasing but CÂPR. This apparent inconsistency
occurs because the proof of GGD’s result relies on the assumption (unstated in the main text
of the paper) of logconcavity for the c.d.f. F: our example violates logconcavity of F and thus
the simple property of increasing f does not imply PRÂC.3
In order to analyze regime C, GGD focus on pure strategy symmetric Nash Equilibrium,
but they neglect that in some cases no such equilibrium exists. We point out that Caplin and
1In fact, GGD also study a model in which B approaches suppliers sequentially and needs to derive the
optimal stopping rule. We do not consider this setting in our paper.
2While this commitment assumption may appear strong, GGD notice that B may choose between providing
a detailed speciﬁcation of the attributes of the object he wishes to procure (which allows each supplier i to infer
xi), and providing instead vague or minimal details (which leaves each supplier in the dark).
3Our example is relevant also because GGD fail to ﬁnd a distribution such that CÂPR.
2Nalebuﬀ (1991) provide suﬃcient conditions for existence in a more general model. Further-
m o r e ,w en o t i c et h a tw h e nn =2the property that f is increasing has the same eﬀect on the
comparison between C and PR as the property that f is decreasing; in a sense, this is at odds
with the focus of GGD on increasing densities.
Finally, in Section 3 we consider the case of risk averse suppliers with constant relative risk
aversion, and show that CÂPR under strong risk aversion, regardless of the distribution. The
proofs are given in the appendix.
2 A few remarks and complements to the analysis of GGD
GGD assume that suppliers are risk neutral and, for regime C, they consider symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibria (NE henceforth), that is NE in which all suppliers make the same
bid ˆ p>0 [if ˆ p =0 , then each supplier earns zero but can make a positive proﬁtw i t hab i d
in (0,1)]. In order to derive ˆ p, GGD study supplier i’ so p t i m a lc h o i c eo fh e ro w nb i dpi,
given that each other supplier plays ˆ p.S i n c e i wins if and only if xi − pi >x j − ˆ p for any
j 6= i (neglecting zero probability events), and she does not observe (x1,...,x n), i evaluates
her own winning probability as
R 1
0 Fn−1(xi +ˆ p − pi)f(xi)dxi and i’s payoﬀ as a function of
pi is πi(pi) ≡ pi
R 1
0 Fn−1(xi +ˆ p − pi)f(xi)dxi (each supplier bears no production cost). GGD





0 (n − 1)Fn−2(x)f2(x)dx
(1)
This implies that the unique candidate for a symmetric pure strategy NE is the proﬁle in which
each supplier bids ˆ p in (1), denoted by ˆ p in the following. Given ˆ p, the highest ﬁtness supplier
wins. The problem with this methodology is that merely satisfying a FOC does not guarantee
that a maximum point for πi is obtained. Indeed, in some cases ˆ p is not a NE, and then no
symmetric pure strategy NE exists.
Example 1 Suppose that n =2and f(x)=2
3x−1/3, F(x)=x2/3;t h e nˆ p = 3
8. However, given
p2 = 3














16.T h u sˆ p =( 3
8, 3
8) is not a NE.4
Example 1 suggests some caution with GGD’s analysis for regime C, but under suitable
conditions it is possible to prove that ˆ p is a NE. Indeed, Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) (CN
henceforth) provide an existence theorem for models of price competition with diﬀerentiated
products which include GGD’s C setting. In particular, Theorem 2 in CN implies that ˆ p is a
4Perloﬀ and Salop (1985) consider a model of product diﬀerentiation which is formally equivalent to GGD’s
C setting. They notice that a symmetric pure strategy NE may not exist, but in their counterexample F has a
mass point and thus is not absolutely continuous.
3NE as long as f is logconcave (in fact, a somewhat weaker condition suﬃces).5
In the regime of PR, B privately reveals to supplier i (for i =1 ,...,n) the signal xi.
GGD consider symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE henceforth), that is BNE in which each
supplier bids according to the same bidding function P :[ 0 ,1] → R, which depends on the







Supplier i wins if and only if xi − P(xi) >x j − P(xj) for any j 6= i, and since xi − P(xi) >
xj − P(xj) i fa n do n l yi fxi >x j, it follows that the highest ﬁtness supplier wins under PR.6
Given that B selects the supplier with the highest ﬁtness in both regimes C and PR, B
prefers the regime in which his expected payment is lower. In the case of C, B pays simply
ˆ p. In PR, B’s expected payment is
R 1
0 P(x)dFn(x), the expected bid of the highest ﬁtness
supplier. Simple manipulations reveal that
R 1











Proposition 2 in GGD claims that when f is increasing, the inequality P(x) ≤ ˆ p holds for any
x ∈ [0,1]. An obvious corollary is then as follows [Proposition 3(ii) in GGD]: If f is increasing,
then (3) holds strictly. However, the proof of Proposition 2 uses both the assumption of f
increasing and of logconcavity for F; thus, such a proposition should be stated as follows: If F
is logconcave and f is increasing, then P(x) ≤ ˆ p for any x ∈ [0,1]; the corollary, Proposition
3(ii), should be stated as follows:
If F is logconcave and f is increasing, then PR Â C( 4 )
Our example 2 below is such that f is increasing, F is not logconcave and (3) is violated, which
means that CÂPR. Therefore it cannot be proved that PRÂC under the sole assumption that
f is increasing; a fortiori, the same assumption alone does not imply that P(x) ≤ ˆ p for any
x ∈ [0,1]. Example 2 is of interest also because GGD cannot ﬁnd an example such that CÂPR.




2 for x ∈ [0, 4
5]





2x for x ∈ [0, 4
5]
3x − 2 for x ∈ (4
5,1]
5The density f is said to be logconcave if and only if logf is a concave function. In fact, in CN the set of
feasible prices for each supplier is [0,y],w h e r ey>0 is a ﬁxed parameter, but for GGD’s C setting existence
can be proved, under f logconcave, even though there is no maximal price; details are available in the appendix.
See Section 6.3 in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a very readable presentation of CN’s result.
6T h ea n a l y s i so fG G Dc a nb es i m p l i ﬁed by noticing that this setting is closely related to the well known
environment in which an object is sold through a ﬁrst price auction with n bidders: we can prove that there is
a one-to-one correspondence between the BNE in the two settings. Then (2) is obtained straightforwardly.
4We ﬁnd that ˆ p = 1
4, but f is not logconcave [since logf is not continuous in (0,1)] and thus
we cannot apply the results of CN to infer that (p1,p 2)=( 1
4, 1
4) is a NE under C; however, we
can prove this result directly.7 G i v e nt h i sf a c t ,w ec o m p a r eCa n dP Rb yv e r i f y i n gt h a t( 3 )
reduces to 2 · 23
150 · 2 ≤ 1
2, which is violated.
In order to understand how much the result as stated in (4) is more restrictive with respect
to the formulation in GGD, it is useful to notice that F logconcave is equivalent to
f
F decreasing,
which fails to hold if f increases too quickly. Thus the assumption in (4) is that f is increasing
but nowhere too quickly.8
When they provide an intuition on why an increasing f favors PR against C, GGD argue
that in such a case a high ﬁtness supplier is likely to face competitors with high ﬁtness, and this
induces her to bid low under PR. The opposite argument applies if f is decreasing, since then
ah i g hﬁtness supplier likely faces low ﬁtness competitors and thus she may want to bid less
aggressively. This intuition is incomplete, as it neglects the eﬀect of f on ˆ p, and furthermore
the next proposition casts some doubts on it when n =2 . To this purpose, we deﬁne
g(x) ≡ f(1 − x), G(x) ≡
Z x
0
g(z)dz for any x ∈ [0,1] (5)
It is simple to see that g is a density function on [0,1] and G is its c.d.f.; moreover, the graph
of g is the mirror image of the graph of f with respect to the vertical line x = 1
2.
Proposition 1 Given an arbitrary density f and c.d.f. F,i fg and G are deﬁned as in (5)
then 2
R 1






0 g2(x)dx.T h u s ,w h e nn =2
the left hand side of (3) is unchanged if f is replaced by its mirror image with respect to x = 1
2.
As a consequence, if f is increasing then g is decreasing and it satisﬁes or violates (3) just
like f does. Therefore, when n =2 , satisfying (3) with an increasing density is just ”as simple
as” satisfying (3) with a decreasing density.
3T h e e ﬀect of risk aversion
In this section we consider the case in which suppliers are risk averse with a utility function u
which is strictly increasing, strictly concave and such that u(0) = 0.I np a r t i c u l a rw ea n a l y z e
how a speciﬁc form of risk aversion aﬀects B’s preferences between C and PR.
7The proof is available in the appendix. Indeed, ﬁnding a distribution which violates (3) is relatively straight-
forward, but it is quite less simple to ﬁnd a distribution such that in addition ˆ p i saN Eu n d e rC .
8It is worthwhile to notice that when f is logconcave we have that (i) ˆ p is a NE in regime C; (ii) F is
logconcave in view of Lemma 3 in An (1998). Thus, when f is logconcave it is correct to claim that f increasing
implies PRÂC. But GGD make no assumption about the logconcavity of f.
5Proposition 2 (i) Suppose that suppliers are risk averse. If a symmetric pure strategy NE




and ˆ pr < ˆ p.I ff is logconcave, then the proﬁle of bids in which each supplier bids ˆ pr is a NE.
(ii) Under private revelation, in any symmetric pure strategy BNE each supplier with type x









and Pr(x) <P(x) for any x ∈ (0,1].
Proposition 2 reveals that risk averse suppliers are more aggressive than risk neutral sup-
p l i e r s ,b o t hi nr e g i m eCa n di nr e g i m eP R . 9 The intuition for this result is that a risk averse
supplier bids more aggressively than a risk neutral supplier because she tries to win with a
higher probability, albeit with a smaller proﬁt.10
We now consider the particular case in which u(p)=pa for some a ∈ (0,1),w h i c hm e a n s
that each supplier has constant relative risk aversion degree and risk aversion is stronger the








and multiplying both sides of (8) by F
n−1









dz.N e x t
proposition shows that CÂPR when suppliers are very risk averse, regardless of the distribution.
Proposition 3 When each supplier has the utility function u(p)=pa and is very risk averse,
that is when the parameter a is close to zero, C is the best policy for B for any distribution F
such that the proﬁle of strategies in which each supplier bids ˆ pr is a NE under C.
As we noticed with regard to Proposition 2, risk aversion induces lower bids for both regimes
C and PR, but Proposition 3 reveals that strong risk aversion has a greater eﬀect on C than on
PR and leads to CÂPR for any distribution. We found diﬃcult to provide a good intuition for
this result, especially because when a is close to zero, both under C and under PR the bids are
close to zero. However, it is maybe worthwhile to notice that in a sense each supplier i operates
9In fact, GGD also study the full revelation policy (FR) in which B reveals x1,...,xn to each supplier, and
they show that FR∼PR when suppliers are risk neutral. Risk aversion does not modify the suppliers’ behavior
under FR and thus PRÂFR by Proposition 2(ii). This justiﬁes our focus on the comparison between C and PR.
10This is the well known intuition which applies to an auction setting in which an object is sold by using a
ﬁrst price auction and bidders are risk averse [see for instance Maskin and Riley (1984)].
6in a more risky environment in regime C with respect to PR, as in regime C there is one more
piece of information that i fails to have, the own ﬁtness parameter xi. As a consequence, it
seems conceivable that risk aversion induces more aggressive bids under C than under PR, as
it is seen in the next example.
Example 3 Suppose that F(x)=xθ with θ ≥ 1,s ot h a tf is logconcave; then ˆ pr = aˆ p =
(θn−1)a
n(n−1)θ2 and Pr(x)= a
θ(n−1)+ax. This shows that as a is reduced from 1 to a0 ∈ (0,1) (i) the
bid under C is just a0 times the bid when a =1 : the bid is reduced by the percentage 1−a0;( i i )
under PR the bid of each type x is
[θ(n−1)+1]
θ(n−1)+a0 a0 times the bid when a =1 ,a n d
[θ(n−1)+1]
θ(n−1)+a0 a0 >a 0:
the bid is reduced by a percentage smaller than 1−a0; thus risk aversion favors C with respect
to PR. Precisely, the proof of Proposition 3 establishes that CÂPR if and only if (16) holds,
and (16) reduces to θ(n − 1) > (θ2n2 − 1)a given F(x)=xθ. This shows that PRÂCf o ra
close to 1, but the inequality becomes less restrictive as a is reduced in (0,1) and there is an
a∗ ∈ (0,1) such that CÂPR for a between 0 and a∗, as Proposition 3 states.
4A p p e n d i x
Proof of the claim in footnote 5
Given any y>0, Theorem 2 in CN implies that a pure strategy symmetric NE under C exists
when each supplier’s price is constrained to belong to [0,y], provided that f is logconcave.
Here we prove that ˆ p is a NE when there is no maximal level for prices, provided that f is
logconcave. Precisely, we show that (i) ˆ p is a NE when each price must belong to [0,y] and y
is larger than ˆ p;( i i )ˆ p i saN Ea l s ow h e ne a c hp r i c ec a nb ea n yn o nn e g a t i v en u m b e r .
Regarding (i), suppose that y>ˆ p. We know by Theorem 2 in CN that a pure strategy symmet-
ric NE exists and the only candidates are ˆ p and the proﬁle such that each supplier bids y.T h e
expected proﬁt of supplier i when each other supplier bids y is pi
R 1
0 Fn−1(xi+y−pi)f(xi)dxi,








ˆ p) < 0 after using (1). As a consequence, the proﬁle such that
each supplier bids y is not a NE but ˆ p is so in view of the existence theorem.
Regarding (ii), assume that there is no upper bound on prices and that all suppliers diﬀerent
from i bid ˆ p. Then there exists no pi 6=ˆ p which yields supplier i ap r o ﬁt higher than i’s proﬁt
from bidding ˆ p,b e c a u s ei fs u c hapi existed then ˆ p would not be a NE when prices need to
belong to [0,y] and y>max{ˆ p,pi}, contradicting (i).
Proof of the claim in footnote 6
Consider the auction sale environment (denoted by AS in the following) in which an object
is sold through a ﬁrst price auction with n bidders and xi is the valuation of bidder i,f o ri =
71,...,n. In such a setting a symmetric BNE is characterized by a bidding function β :[ 0 ,1] → R
such that each bidder with type x bids β(x). The following result links the PR setting of GGD
and the AS setting.
Lemma 1 In the PR setting of GGD, there exists a symmetric BNE in which the bidding
function is P if and only if there exists a symmetric BNE in the AS setting in which the
bidding function is β with β(x)=x − P(x) for any x ∈ [0,1].
Proof. For the PR setting of GGD, there exists a symmetric BNE in which all suppliers bid
according to the function P i fa n do n l yi f
for any xi ∈ [0,1],
pi Pr{xi − pi >x j − P(xj) for any j 6= i}
is maximized with respect to pi at pi = P(xi)
(9)
In the AS environment there exists a symmetric BNE in which all bidders bid according to the
function β i fa n do n l yi f
for any xi ∈ [0,1],
(xi − bi)Pr{bi > β(xj) for any j 6= i}
is maximized with respect to bi at bi = β(xi)
(10)
Now we prove that P satisﬁes (9) if and only if β satisﬁes (10) with β(x)=x − P(x).F o r
instance, suppose that P satisﬁes (9) and let β(x) ≡ x − P(x), so that (10) is written as
for any xi ∈ [0,1],
(xi − bi)Pr{bi >x j − P(xj) for any j 6= i}
is maximized with respect to bi at bi = xi − P(xi)
(11)
a n du p o nu s i n gpi instead of xi − bi we see that (11) is equivalent to (9). Since (9) is satisﬁed
by assumption, we infer that also (11) holds, and so (10) is satisﬁed with β(x)=x − P(x).
Therefore, there exists a BNE in the AS environment in which all bidders bid according to
β(x)=x − P(x).
In a very similar manner we can prove the reverse implication: suppose that β satisﬁes (10)
and let P(x) ≡ x − β(x), so that (9) is written as
for any xi ∈ [0,1],
pi Pr{xi − pi > β(xj) for any j 6= i}
is maximized with respect to pi at pi = xi − β(xi)
(12)
and upon using bi instead of xi−pi we see that (12) is equivalent to (10). Since (10) is satisﬁed
by assumption, we infer that also (12) holds, and so (9) is satisﬁed with P(x)=x − β(x).
Therefore, there exists a BNE in the PR setting of GGD in which all suppliers bid according
to P(x)=x − β(x).
In the AS environment, when the bidders’ values are i.i.d. with c.d.f. F,i ti sk n o w nt h a t




Fn−1(x)dz, thus it follows from Lemma





8Proof for example 2
Since suppliers are ex ante symmetric, we prove that (p1,p 2)=( 1
4, 1
4) is a NE under C by
showing that given p2 = 1
4, the proﬁt of supplier 1 is maximized at p1 = 1
4. The proﬁto f1a s
a function of p1 is π1(p1)=p1
R 1
0 F(1
4 + x1 − p1)f(x1)dx1 and π1(1
4)=1
8; in the following we
distinguish the case of p1 < 1
4 from the case of p1 > 1
4.
• For p1 < 1
4 we ﬁnd that 1









If p1 ≤ 1



































for any p1 ∈ [0, 1
20].
If 1
20 <p 1 < 1




















4 + x1 − p1) − 2)3dx1 + p1
R 1
3











128 > 0 for any p1 ∈ ( 1
20, 1
4).
• For p1 > 1
4 we ﬁnd that 1








4 <p 1 ≤ 9































for any p1 ∈ (1
4, 53
124) while π0




20 <p 1 ≤ 21









































385) ' 0.11654,w h i c h




20 <p 1 ≤ 5















4 p1 + 9
4p2
1 < 0 for any p1 ∈ (21
20, 5
4).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1


















0 G(x)[1−G(x)]dx,w ed e ﬁne Φ(x)=F(x)[1−





0 Γ(1 − x)dx =
R 1
0 Γ(x)dx (the latter equality is proved by using
9the substitution z =1− x); thus our goal is achieved. We notice that the derivative of
Φ is f(x)[1 − 2F(x)], while the derivative of Γ(1 − x) is g(1 − x)[2G(1 − x) − 1],t h a ti s
f(x)[2G(1 − x) − 1]. These derivatives are equal as long as 1=F(x)+G(1 − x),a n dt h i s




0 f(1 − z)dz =
R 1
x f(t)dt after using the
substitution t =1− z.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) This proof mimics the arguments in GGD, already sketched in Section 2. We consider
symmetric pure strategy NE, in which all suppliers make the same bid ˆ pr and examine the
point of view of supplier i, who supposes that pj =ˆ pr for any j 6= i.I fi chooses pi, then she
wins with probability q(pi) ≡
R 1
0 Fn−1(xi+ˆ pr−pi)f(xi)dxi and she is interested in maximizing
u(pi)q(pi). The FOC with respect to pi is u0(pi)
R 1
0 Fn−1(xi +ˆ pr − pi)f(xi)dxi = u(pi)
R 1
0 (n −




0 (n − 1)Fn−2(xi)f2(xi)dxi. This equality is equivalent to (6) in view
of (1).
Since u is concave, it is possible to prove that
u(p)
u0(p) is strictly increasing and that
u(p)
u0(p) >pfor
any p>0.T h u sw eﬁnd that ˆ pr < ˆ p.
In order to establish existence when f is logconcave it is useful to recall the arguments of CN.
CN show that (i) f logconcave implies that v(pi) ≡ 1
q(pi) is convex in pi;( i i )i fv is convex,
then the payoﬀ of supplier i under risk neutrality, piq(pi), is quasiconcave in pi.G i v e n t h e
constraint that pi belongs to the compact set [0,y],w eﬁnd that (i) and (ii) allow to apply a
standard existence theorem [theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)]. Under risk aversion,
(i) still holds and thus we now prove that if v is convex, then the payoﬀ of supplier i under risk
aversion, u(pi)q(pi), is quasiconcave; this is done with the following minor extension of the proof
of Proposition 3 in CN. In view of a contradiction, suppose that u(pi)q(pi) is not quasiconcave.
Then there exists two prices p0
i and p1
i,a n dλ ∈ (0,1) such that pλ













i) > 0, q(p1
i) > 0 and we can divide the inequalities in (13) by q(p0
i)q(pλ
i ) and by
q(p1
i)q(pλ





















Now we multiply the inequalities in (14) by 1 − λ and λ, respectively, and add the results to





















10But the inequality 1
q(pλ




i) implied by (15) is impossible, as it violates the assump-
tion that v is convex. This implies existence when each price needs to belong to [0,y],a n d
then we can argue like in the Proof of the claim in footnote 5 above in order to establish that
a symmetric pure strategy NE exists when there is no upper bound on prices.
(ii) Lemma 1 introduced above in Proof of the claim in footnote 6 holds also in the case that
suppliers are risk averse: it suﬃces to replace pi and (xi − bi) in (9) and (10) with u(pi) and
u(xi − bi), respectively, and the proof still applies. For the AS setting we know from Maskin
and Riley (1984) that a unique symmetric BNE exists, and the equilibrium bidding function
βr satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation −u0[x − βr(x)]β0
r(x)+( n − 1)
f(x)
F(x)u[x − βr(x)] = 0.B y
replacing βr(x) with x − Pr(x) we obtain (7).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
It turns out that xi − Pr(xi) >x j − Pr(xj) i fa n do n l yi fxi >x j, hence the highest
ﬁtness supplier wins in both regimes C and PR. Then we compare B’s expected payments: he









a (x)f(x)dx in PR. The latter





a (x) − Fn(x)]dx,11 thus CÂP Ri fa n do n l yi f
n

















a (x) − Fn(x)]dx = n
n−1
R 1







Fn−2(x)f2(x)dx > 1 (17)








0 Fn−1(x)f(x)dx = 1


















We prove (17) by showing that the inequality in (18) is strict. If that inequality is an equality,











λx for some k ∈ R, a contradiction since F is a c.d.f.
11This is correct as long as a 6=
n−1
n ,a n dw h e na is close to zero we can neglect the case of a =
n−1
n .
12Section 6.2 in Royden (1968) introduces the so-called Hölder inequality, of which the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality is the particular case that is obtained by setting p = q =2in the notation of Royden (1968).
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